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THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS
AND THE OBLIGATION UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
Kamrul Hossain*

ABSTRACT
By virtue of Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, an
obligation under the Charter prevails over an obligation arising out of any
other international agreement. The decisions in the Security Council that
give rise to a compelling obligation upon the member states are taken
mostly by means of political consideration.

Article 103 obligates all

member states to comply with these decisions.

Since member states

agreed to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in Article 25, this
Article 103 obligation operates irrespective of any other obligation arising
out of other treaties or agreement, even if it is contrary to those of general
U.N. obligations. The question, however, is whether a Charter obligation
could override an obligation that represents the norm of jus cogens. This
article discusses the concept of jus cogens, its peremptory nature and how
the Charter of the United Nations reflects the norm of jus cogens as its
fundamental principle. Thus, any decision taken under the Charter should
conform to the norm of jus cogens.
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Jus cogens, the literal meaning of which is “compelling law,” is
the technical term given to those norms of general international law that
are argued as hierarchically superior.1 These are, in fact, a set of rules,
which are peremptory in nature and from which no derogation is allowed
under any circumstances. The doctrine of international jus cogens was
developed under a strong influence of natural law concepts, which
maintain that states cannot be absolutely free in establishing their
contractual relations. States were obliged to respect certain fundamental
principles deeply rooted in the international community.2 The power of a
state to make treaties is subdued when it confronts a super-customary
norm of jus cogens. 3

In other words, jus cogens are rules, which

correspond to the fundamental norm of international public policy and in
which cannot be altered unless a subsequent norm of the same standard is
established. This means that the position of the rules of jus cogens is
hierarchically superior compared to other ordinary rules of international
law.
In fact, there are rules, which are preconditions for effective
international activity, such as pacta sunt servanda. To abrogate such a
rule is not possible. A treaty providing that pacta sunt servanda is mere
reaffirmation. A treaty denying it is an absurdity. The point is that the
very activity of treaty-making assumes the general rule which complies
with the international public policy and is accepted by the international
* (LL.M, LL.Lic.) Doctoral candidate, University of Helsinki.
1
REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2d ed. 1994).
2
See Gennady M. Danilenko, International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 42, 44 (1991), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.
3
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 26-27 (Nomos ed., 1987).
Under the stewardship of its fourth Rapporteur, Weldock, the International Law
Commission [hereinafter ILC] undertook in-depth discussion of jus cogens. As reflected
in the relevant ILC Yearbooks, that there was agreement in regards to the existence of the
rules of jus cogens and the peremptory norms were viewed as norms from which states
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community at large.4 Rules contrary to the notion of jus cogens could be
regarded as void, since those rules oppose the fundamental norms of
international public policy.
As a result, jus cogens rules gained the nature of international
constitutional rules for two reasons. First, they limit the ability of states to
create or change rules of international law. Second, these rules prevent
states from violating fundamental rules of international public policy since
the resulting rules or violations of rules would be seriously detrimental to
the international legal system.5 Clearly defined contents of the rules of jus
cogens are not yet likely to be decided. Existence of such norms is now
universally recognized and well established.
Recognition of Jus Cogens in International Law
During the early nineteenth century, recognition of jus cogens was
established. Professor Oppenheim stated that there existed a number of
“universally recognized principles” of international law that rendered any
conflicting treaty void, and therefore, the peremptory effect of such
principles was itself a “unanimously recognized customary rule of
International Law.”6 For example, he stated that a treaty supporting piracy
is void for being contrary to the “universally recognized principles” of
international law.7 Moreover, the concept of jus cogens twice found favor
cannot contract out. See [1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 52, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963.
4
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-80 (1979).
5
See Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga
Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT’L L. nos. 2-3 211, 219-220 (1997).
6
OPPENHEIM ET AL., OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 1 PEACE,
introduction & part I (1992).
7
Id. at 528. During the years of 1963 to 1966, several members pointed out in the ILC
commentary that the emergence of rules having the character of jus cogens was not the
product of recent time, rather it has more long-standing character. They further stated
that the concept of jus cogens had originated in regard to such universal crimes as piracy
and the slave-trade as well as such principles as the freedom of high seas and other rules
on the law of the sea. For more information, see LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY
NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-62 (1988).
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in a judicial context, first, in the decision of the French-Mexican Claims
Commission in the 1928 Pablo Nájera Case, and later by Judge Schücking
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1934 Oscar Chinn
Case [1934] PCIJ 2 (12 December 1934).8 Subsequent to this 1934 case,
judges of the International Court of Justice made similar references to jus
cogens in a number of separate and dissenting opinions.9 For example, in
a 1993 Bosnian case, Judge Lauterpacht expressed his opinion on the
possibility that the Security Council had violated the genocide prohibition
and therewith alleged jus cogens when imposing an arms embargo on both
Serbia and Bosnia. In 1991, Resolution 713 of the Security Council
imposed arms embargo.

While this resolution disregarded the state’s

inherent right of self-defense, the Security Council had been unable to take
measures necessary to maintain peace and security in Bosnia.

The

consequences led to ethnic cleansing, genocide and large-scale human
sufferings. Therefore, the argument of alleged violation of jus cogens has
some potential weight.
Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has
given the recognition of the norms of jus cogens in Article 53, where it
states:
A treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For
the purpose of the present convention, a peremptory norm
of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a
whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
8

Byers, supra note 5, at 213-214 n.8-9.
Id. at 214 n.10. For the opinion of the ICJ, see, for example, Application of the
Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Neth. v. Swed.)1958 I.C.J.
55 (Nov. 28) (separate opinion of Judge Quintana); Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (Port. v. India) 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12) (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc
Fernandes); South West Aftica Case, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.)
1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka); North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (F.R.G./Den. v. F.R.G./Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20) (separate opinion of Judge
Nervo).
9
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and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.10
That means a treaty is no longer an international legal document, if, at the
time of its conclusion, it conflicts with the norms of jus cogens, which are
peremptory in nature. This article sets up the four criteria for a norm to be
determined as jus cogens, specifically: (1) status as a norm of general
international law; (2) acceptance by the international community of states
as a whole; (3) immunity from derogation; and (4) modifiable only by a
new norm having the same status.
On

the

other

hand,

Finnish

scholar

Lauri

Hannikainen

demonstrated that if a norm of general international law protects an
overriding interest or value of the international community, and if any
derogation would seriously jeopardize that interest or value, then the
peremptory character of the norm may be presumed if the application of
the criteria of peremptory norms produces no noteworthy negative
evidence.11
Recognition of the rules of jus cogens was again confirmed in
1986 at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations. The
importance of the rules of jus cogens was confirmed by the trend to apply
it beyond the law of the treaties, in particular, in the law of state
responsibility.

Specifically, the International Law Commission (ILC)

proposed the notion of international crimes resulting from the breach by a
state of an international obligation “essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community,” which is, in fact,

10

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/ 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.
11
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
20, 207.
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closely linked to the doctrine of international jus cogens. 12 In the
Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice clearly affirmed jus
cogens as an accepted doctrine in international law.13 The ICJ relied on
the prohibition on the use of force as being “a conspicuous example of a
rule of international law having the character of jus cogens.”14
Status of the Norm in International Law
A peremptory norm may, it would appear, be derived from a
custom or a treaty, but not, it is submitted, from any other source.15 This
statement is, however, self-contradictory.

Indeed, there are serious

problems associated with the assertions that a norm of jus cogens could be
the result of the natural law, or, one or any of the traditional primary
sources of international law, namely, treaties, customs or general
principles of laws.16 According to Professor Michale Byers of the Duke
University Law School, treaties can, at best, only be contributing factors in
the development of jus cogens rules for two reasons. First, a treaty cannot
bind its parties’ abilities to modify the treaty terms nor to relieve the
party’s obligations under it, such as through a subsequent treaty to which
all the same parties have consented. Second, all generally accepted jus
cogens rules apply universally yet none of the treaties, which have
codified these rules, have been universally ratified. No treaty, not even
the Charter of the Charter of the United Nations, can establish a rule of
12

See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 43; Byers, supra note 5, at 214; Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, art. 19, available at http://www.javier-leondiaz.com/humanitarianIssues/State_Resp.pdf.
13
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27).
14
See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing Nicar. V. U.S.).
15
WALLACE, supra note 1, at 33. In the Nicaragua Case, the I.C.J. clearly proceeded on
the assumption that the peremptory rule prohibiting the use of force was based not on
some exotic source, but on the two most commonly used and established sources of law,
namely treaty and custom. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 97,
100.
16
Byers, supra note 5, at 220-221 n.34.
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general international law. Treaties can only create obligations between
their parties.17
As for the assertion that jus cogens rules to be considered as
customary international law, more ambiguity exists. Customs are binding
only in the case of an established opinio juris wherein a state believes to
be bound by a said practice due to its creation from customary rule.
However, persistent objection of any customary principle creates an
exception to have the binding nature of such rules. There are also other
ways to supersede customary rules, such as through the development of
rules of special customary international law and the conclusion of treaties.
On the other hand, in case of the rules of jus cogens, these rules are
binding regardless of the consent of the parties concerned and regardless
of the states’ own individual opinion to be bound since these rules are too
fundamental for states to escape responsibility. Modification of the rules
of jus cogens is only possible when a new peremptory norm of equal
weight emerges.
As for the binding character of jus cogens, acceptance by the large
majority of states of such norm would amount to universal legal obligation
for the international community as a whole. These are superior rules and
bear the common values for the international community as a whole.
Michael Byers, however, tends to show that jus cogens rules are derived
from the “process of customary international law,” which is itself a part of
international constitutional order. 18

He argues that opinio juris (or

something resembling opinio juris) appears to be at the root of the nondetractable character of jus cogens rules, because states simply do not
17

Id. at 221. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10, arts. 34,
39, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm; Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 12, art. 29(1), available at http://www.javier-leondiaz.com/humanitarianIssues/State_Resp.pdf.
18
Byers, supra note 5, at 222.
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believe that it is possible to contract out of jus cogens rules or to
persistently object to them. States regard these rules as being so important
to the international society of states and to how that society defines itself,
such that they cannot conceive of an exception.19 Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention, however, contains no reference to any element of practice.
One could then hardly conceive jus cogens as a strengthened form of
custom.20 David Kennedy termed jus cogens as super-customary norm.21
In fact, two views predominate regarding the foundation of the
concept of jus cogens, the first, as directly originating from international
law, or the second, as being based on the one of the existing sources of
international law.

However, some argue and accept that jus cogens

recognizes a wholly new source of law capable of generally binding rules.
This idea was developed during the Vienna Conference on the Law of the
Treaties at which jus cogens was interpreted to indicate that a majority
could bring into existence peremptory norms which could bind the
international community of states as a whole, regardless of the individual
consent of the states. Thus, the result is a new source of law founded on
the basis that a community as a whole may create rules that will bind all
its members, notwithstanding their possible individual dissent. Others
argue that the existing sources have been modified to allow majority rulemaking in the context of higher law.22 However, the negotiating history of
the Vienna Convention does not support the view that the notion of jus
cogens emerges as a new source of general international law. Rather,
there was a clear tendency to view jus cogens as the product of the

19

Id. at 221
See generally Danilenko, supra note 2, available at
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.
21
See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 26-27.
22
See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 42.
20
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existing sources.23 For example, France argued that if the draft article on
jus cogens was interpreted to mean that a majority could bring into
existence peremptory norms that would be valid erga omnes, then the
result created an international source of law. France objected to such a
possibility on the ground that such a new source of law would be subject
to no “control and lacking all responsibility.”24
Moreover, complexity remains in the interpretation of Article 53,
regarding the phrase: “acceptance and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole.” M.K. Yasseen, the former Chairman of
the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,
states that
[T]here is no question of requiring a rule to be accepted and
recognized as peremptory by all States. It would be enough
if a very large majority did so; that would mean that, if one
state in isolation refused to accept the peremptory character
of a rule, or if that state was supported by a very small
number of states, the acceptance and recognition of the
peremptory character of the rule by the international
community as a whole would not be affected.25
Yasseen further stated that no individual state should have the right of
veto. Additionally, in the ILC commentary to the Article 19 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, it explained the meaning of “as a whole”
within the context of requiring international recognition of international
crimes:
[T]his certainly does not mean the requirement of
unanimous recognition by all the members of the
community, which would give each state an inconceivable
right of veto. What it is intended to ensure is that a given
international wrongful act shall be recognized as an
“international crime”, not only by some particular group of
23

Id.
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties I, at 94.
25
Id. at 472
24
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states, even if it constitutes a majority, but by all the
essential components of the international community.26
This means that “a very large majority” will not necessarily be able to
impose its will on “a very small minority” if that “small minority”
represents a significant element of the international community. The same
view was expressed at the Vienna Conference by the representative of the
United States, namely, that the recognition of the peremptory character of
a norm “would require, at a minimum, absence of dissent by any important
element of the international community.”27 The representative of Australia
stressed that “rules could only be regarded as having the status of jus
cogens if there was the substantial concurrence of states belonging to all
principal legal systems.”28
Debate continues, not concerning the existence of the notion of jus
cogens, but on two other issues. The first one concerns the status of jus
cogens either as a new source of international law or as part of other
existing sources of international law. The second one concerns the process
of law-making under the norm of jus cogens. While there is realistically
no special source for creating constitutional or fundamental principles in
the present international legal order, we all know that international law
itself is under the constant process of development — “development
towards greater coherence.”29
The existence of the concept of jus cogens was, nonetheless, not
denied by the states at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties.
Rather, it was argued that the essence of the concept is that it must affect
all states without exception. Indeed, states at the Vienna Convention
26

Summary Records of the 1374th Meeting, [1976] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 73, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/291 and Add.1-2.
27
U.N. Conference on Law of Treaties II, at 102.
28
Supra note 24, at 388.
29
CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 79.

81

Vol. 3 [2005]

JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
Kamrul Hossain

82

reached an agreement on a constitutional principle that the peremptory
norms

bound

all

members

of

the

international

community,

notwithstanding their possible dissent. 30 It was also argued that the
principal criterion of peremptory rules was considered to be the fact that
they serve the interest of the international community, not the needs of
individual states.31 However, some counter with the domestic law analogy
— good customs, morals and public policies were applied in specific cases
without insoluble difficulties even though these items were not necessarily
defined in municipal law.32 Moreover, since the adoption of the Vienna
Convention on Law of the Treaties, the norm of jus cogens has gained a
wide support among the commentators and writers.33 Therefore, it could
be argued that the objecting states are bound by the concept so far as
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention is declaratory of an already existing
international law concerning jus cogens.34 In fact, the principle of consent
is a further structural principle of international law, distinct from jus
cogens.35

30

Danilenko, supra note 2, available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.
This view was address by the representative of Zambia at the Vienna Conference, see
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties I, at 322.
32
Statement of the representative of Philippines. See U.N. Conference on Law of Treaties
II, at 95.
33
For example, Ch. L. Rozakis writes that once adopted, the peremptory norms bind the
entire international community and in consequence a state can no longer be dissociated
from the binding peremptory character of that rule even if it proves that no evidence
exists of its acceptance and recognition of the function of that rule, or moreover, that it
has expressly denied; L.A. Alexidze holds that norms of jus cogens are based on the
common will of the international community and as absolute norms these norms bind
even dissenters; G. Gaja maintained that a peremptory norm necessarily operates with
regard to all states; R. St. J. Macdonald addressed that the consent of a very large
majority will binding on all states, including those which expressly refused to
acknowledge them. See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 51.
34
Id.
35
CRAWFORD, supra note 4 at 80.
31
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Uncertainty on the contents of Jus Cogens
Problems remain as to the application of the norm, in terms of
which rules must necessarily be covered under the said norms. There was
serious doubt concerning the fact that the norm could be misused in
interpreting the rules to be covered under jus cogens. Over-inclusiveness
or under-inclusiveness of the facts might come into being. For example,
during the negotiating process of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the common focus of the developing countries
was to ensure that they represented the interests of all mankind since they
constituted the majority. However, a very small number of Western states
opposed the majority’s proposals, particularly those regarding the legal
status of the seabed. Consequently, developing countries turned to the
notion of jus cogens.

They claimed that the principles of common

heritage of mankind, as proclaimed by the 1970 United Nations General
Assembly resolution on the seabed, were principles of jus cogens. This
argument was clearly rejected by the minority of western states. 36
Nonetheless, the majority, led by the Group of 77, continued to rely on the
notion of jus cogens in order to impose specific normative solutions
regarding the seabed. The Group of 77 asserted that since the common
heritage of mankind is a customary rule which has the force of peremptory
norm, then it would follow that the unilateral legislation and limited
agreements were illegal and were, therefore, violations of this principle.37
Another example could be found concerning the legal nature of the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources proclaimed in a
number of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions. This issue was raised
at the Vienna Conference on Succession of States in Respect of State
36

See, e.g., Statement of the U.S. Delegation, U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea part
XVII at 243; Danilenko. supra note 2, at 59.
37
U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea part XIV, at 112, Doc. A/Conf. 621106 (1980).
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Property, Archives and Debts. The Draft Convention on Succession of
States contained a rule requiring that agreements concluded between a
predecessor state and a newly independent state concerning succession to
state property of the predecessor state not “infringe the principle of the
permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural
resources.”38 In its commentary to a draft article containing this rule, the
ILC noted that some of the members of the Commission expressed the
view that agreements violating the principle of the permanent sovereignty
should be void ab initio. Relying on this commentary, the developing
states claimed that the principle of permanent sovereignty over wealth and
natural resources was a principle of jus cogens. The conference was also
used to impart the jus cogens character to other broad principles, including
the right of the peoples to development, to information about their history,
and to their cultural heritage.39 The idea of invoking some of the General
Assembly Resolutions in terms of the norm of jus cogens, with a plea that
resolutions achieve support from the large majority of states, was
criticized by the Western states that resolutions adopted at the General
Assembly are only recommendatory. These do not have any binding
force.
Therefore, while a very large majority of states support lawmaking under the concept of jus cogens at the session in General
Assembly, it could hardly be possible, unless the other significant
elements of international community, namely the western states, agreed to
do so. Nonetheless, three categories of jus cogens found genuine support,
as suggested by the German scholar Ulrich Scheuner: 40 (1) the rules
protecting the foundations of international order, (i.e., the prohibition of
38

Cf. the Draft Convention on Succession of States.
See Danilenko, supra note 2, available at
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.
39
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genocide or of the use of force in international relations except in selfdefense), (2) the rule concerning peaceful cooperation in the protection of
common interests (i.e., freedom of the seas) and the rules protecting the
most fundamental and basic human rights, and (3) rules for the protection
of the civilians in time of war.
Obligation Under the U.N. Charter
When the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties is itself a
treaty at issue, the Security Council, through its decision under Chapter
VII, may override the treaty obligation by virtue of Article 103. There
remains a question of whether the Security Council is permitted to act in
contrary to the norms of jus cogens, given the constitutional nature of the
United Nation Charter. It remains unclear as to how the international
community, lacking any central legislative authority, can accommodate
the idea of overriding principles binding all of its members.41 There is a
growing danger that in the absence of clearly defined procedures for the
creation of peremptory norms, their emergence and subsequent
identification may become a matter of conflicting assertions reflecting
political preference of different groups of states. 42 While some of the
relevant procedural issues have been clarified, a coherent elaboration of
jus cogens still remains a predominant challenge for the international
community.43 However, we may construct the argument that the Charter
had embodied the norms of fundamental importance, which correspond to
the jus cogens rules. To many, the Charter constitutes the constitution of
international law, so the binding character of those norms could thus easily
be realized.

40

CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 81.
Danilenko, supra note 2, available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.
42
Id.
43
Id.
41
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Is The U.N. Charter Compatible to Jus Cogens?
Three things are to be considered concerning whether the United
Nations Charter is compatible to jus cogens. First, the Charter was entered
into force before the Vienna Convention was even drafted. Second, the
Vienna Convention is not retroactive by its terms. Third, the Vienna
Convention has not seen universal ratification.
Article 4 of the Vienna Convention provides:
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in
the present Convention to which treaties would be subject
under international law independently of the Convention,
the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded
by states after the entry into force of the present
Convention with regard to such states.44
That means the Vienna Convention limits its application only to those
treaties which have been concluded after the Convention’s entry into
force. Therefore, there is a question of how the rules of jus cogens, the
recognition of which is embodied in the article 53 of the Vienna
Convention, affect the U.N. Charter provisions.
Debate at the Vienna Conference reflected concern that the
Convention provisions should preserve the operation of rules of customary
international law as well as take into account general principles of law,
which are a separate source of international law. Article 4 of the Vienna
Convention was inserted to preserve the application of treaties of any preexistent rules of customary international law and general principles of law.
Therefore, the issue of determining whether jus cogens has application to
the Charter upon an international law basis other than the Convention

44

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10 art. 4, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.
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regime suggests analysis on whether jus cogens constitutes a codification
of customary international law or a progressive development.45
Article 15 of the Statute of International Law Commission shows
the difference between progressive development versus codification of
international law. The Statute provides that the progressive development
of international law means “the preparation of Draft Convention on
subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in
regard to which law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice
of states.”46 On the other hand, codification of international law is defined
to contemplate “the more precise formulation and systematization of rules
of international law in the fields where there already has been extensive
state practice, precedent, and doctrine.”47
While submitting the final set of rules regarding the law of the
treaties, the ILC did not specifically categorize whether its work was on
the progressive development or on codification. In fact, in its cover letter,
the Commission stated that its work on the law of the treaties constitutes
both codification and progressive development of international law to the
extent these concepts were defined in Article 15 of the Commission’s
Statute.

It is not practicable to determine into which category each

provision falls.48
Consequently, a similar effect is to be given towards the
peremptory norm, in the sense that it is partly a codification and partly a

45

See IAN MCTAGGERT SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
TREATIES 104-06 (1984); Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and inherent right to Self-defence,
available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/student/organizations/ILSAJournal/33/Kahgan%203-3.htm (last visited Sep. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
46
Statute of International Law Commission art 15, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/statufra.htm.
47
SINCLAIR, supra note 45, at 11.
48
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1966) at 177; SINCLAIR, supra note 45, at 12; Khagan, supra
note 44.
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progressive development of international law.49 It is partly a codification
because the ILC acknowledged that the peremptory norm exists in
international law, which permits no derogation and sets down a general
definition of jus cogens. Furthermore, it is partly progressive development
in relation to the specifics (i.e., which norms were to be accorded jus
cogens status). The ILC left this latter part to be worked out by state
practice and the jurisprudence on international tribunals.50
Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits unilateral use of force
and threat of armed force, corresponds to the pre-existent norms of
international law. Therefore, the notion that the regime is applicable to the
Charter independently of the Vienna Convention was supported by the fact
that the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force was a norm jus cogens
and declarative of a pre-existent normative regime. Furthermore, the ICJ
in the Nicaragua case confirmed that the restriction on use of force was a
recognized normative regime in customary international law before the
Charter. 51

Consequently, even where the Vienna Convention is not

applicable, the principles of Articles 53 and 64 would be effective as
customary law. Article 53 notes that a treaty that is contrary to an existing
rule of jus cogens is void ab initio. 52 Additionally, Article 64 of the
Vienna Convention provided that if a new peremptory norm of general
international law emerges, any existing treaty in conflict with that norm
becomes void and terminable. By virtue of Article 64, an existing treaty
that conflicts with an emergent rule of jus cogens terminates from the date
of the emergence of the rule. It is not void ab initio. Nor by Article 71 is
any right, obligation or legal situation created by the treaty prior to its
49

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 162.
Id.; Kahgan, supra note 45.
51
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra
note 13, at 126-34 ¶¶ 175-94.
52
See 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 52, at 91-92, UN Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963.
50
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termination affected so long as its maintenance is not in itself contrary to
the new peremptory norm.53 The inclusion of the norm as enshrined in
Article 2(4) of the Charter enhances its non-detractable nature since any
action in contravention thereof is a breach of a state’s obligation under the
Charter. However, as jus cogens status is not created by the Charter, the
argument really rests on the notion that what is incorporated in the Charter
is the pre-existent norm, the universality and acceptance of which is
evidenced by inclusion in the Charter.54 To the extent that these norms
were pre-existent and merely codified in the Charter, the Charter becomes
subject to the operation of jus cogens even though it came into force
before the promulgation of the Vienna Convention.55
Jus Cogens Test of Article 2(4)
As discussed, the principle of prohibiting use of force is a preexistent, customary norm in international law.

This norm has been

reflected in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which reads as follows: “All
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”56
Territorial integrity or political independence of a state
corresponds to the term “sovereignty,” which is the basic fundamental
issue of international law. Use of force (or threat of use of force) against
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state clearly
demonstrates the violation of sovereign right. The U.N. Charter upholds
this position in Article 2(4) that such violation is not justified under
present international law. The Charter holds this position as a reflection of
53

SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1991).
See generally Kahgan, supra note 45.
55
SINCLAIR, supra note 45, at 12.
54
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the customary norm57 and thereby prohibits all use (or threat of use) of
force or action with respect to the state in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.58 The remedy for the violation of
this principle invokes the “inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense,” as stated in article 51 of the Charter. It clearly indicates that this
right is to be applied when an armed attacked has occurred.
However, another option is available in this regard. Under Article
39, the Security Council could determine whether a real threat exists for
the maintenance of international peace and security.

If the Security

Council finds in the positive, then further action can be taken, either
through military or through non-military measures, in order to restore the
peace and security. The inherent right of self-defense in the case of an
armed attack is only permissible up to the point that the necessary
measures are taken by the Security Council.

Therefore, the absolute

remedy for the violation of Article 2(4) sits in Chapter VII of the Charter
with the authority of the Security Council. Article 51, which prohibits
reprisals but permits a balanced and proportionate defensive action against
an armed attack, is nonetheless regarded as an “inherent” right
representing the pre-existing norm of international law.59
The development of the notion enshrined in Article 2(4) involves
the long, historical progress of the prohibition of war in the relations
among states. The cause of war has been restructured throughout the ages.
56

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1: “The organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.”
58
U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-2 (stating the purposes and principles of the United Nations).
59
Under customary international law reprisals were, however, lawful if certain criteria
were met, the criteria as attributed to the Naulilaa Arbitration that there must have been a
prior deliberate violation of international law; that an unsuccessful attempt must have
been made at redress; and action taken in reprisal is proportionate to the injury suffered.
See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEM AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE
USE IT 240 (1994).
57
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The Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Declaration of St. Petersburg of
1868 led to the Hague Conventions, which sought to codify customary
principles to make warfare more humane through the development of the
terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The former determines whether the
cause of war is a just one, while the latter determines whether the mode of
fighting is just.60
At the end of World War I, the League of Nations was formed in
order to give peace an institutional framework and to prohibit future war.
The Covenant of the League, however, proved to be “an imperfect
prohibition of war because of textual limitations, lack of will on the part of
the members, and the absence of the USSR and the United States at the
inception of what was to have been a new global system.”61 Article 10 of
the Covenant, which is regarded as the teeth of the Covenant, declared a
commitment to not only respect but also preserve the territorial integrity
and political independence of all members.

This created a binding

obligation upon all states to act individually and collectively through the
Council of the League to defend other individual states against wars of
aggression. In one sense this provided a guarantee of sovereignty of an
individual state, and on the other, this limited the right to go to war. It did
this by means of threatening collective action against those who initiated
war without just cause – a notion defined as premature recourse to
hostilities before the exhaustion of available means for peaceful conflict
resolution.
It is not, however, until 1928, after the conclusion of the General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War (mostly known as Kellogg-Briand
Pact) that war was declared prohibited. Article 2 of the Pact states “that
60

See THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 245
(1995).
61
Id. at 255.
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the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among [the Parties], shall
never be sought except by pacific means.”62 The preamble of the Pact
proclaims “a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of policy.” 63
According to Professor Ian Brownlie, the Kellogg-Briand norm
prohibiting war-making had by 1939 become so well established as “to
justify the assertion that a customary rule had developed.”64 After the end
of Second World War, the continued, normative pull of Kellogg-Briand
was evidenced by the framing of charges against the defendants at the war
crimes trials of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Kellogg-Briand appeared to be
the blueprint for the new United Nations Charter system.65 Therefore, the
idea enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter was nothing new.

It

developed through the customary process of law-making and was codified
in the Charter only as a pre-existent norm.
The Charter is an instrument where almost the whole community
of states is the party, rather than a large majority of states.66 These parties
agree with the norm, as reflected in the Article 2(4) of the Charter. The
norm is so important that it gains the status of general international law
and is accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole, including all the significant components of the international

62

Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 2, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm.
63
See id.; see also FRANCK, supra note 60, at 258.
64
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE BY STATES 108, 110 (1963).
65
FRANCK, supra note 60, at 259.
66
Until the year of 2000, 189 states were parties to the United Nations, see www.un.org.
States outside the U.N. consist of the permanently neutral Switzerland, a few divided
states, and a number of small states with limited international capacity which participate
only to a limited extent in international activities. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at
220.
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community from all major legal systems.67 Moreover, non-members of the
U.N. recognize the basic principles of the Charter. Therefore, the Article
2(4) principle has achieved such importance that all states, including nonmembers of the UN, agree on its non-derogable character.

Any

derogation, therefore, gives rise to action by the Security Council: firstly,
by means of individual or collective self-defense without Security Council
involvement,68 and secondly, by means of enforcement measures taken by
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, or alternatively, by
the Regional Arrangement or Agencies which hold authorization from the
Security Council.69
Regarding the obligation to the non-parties to the UN, Article 2(6)
of the Charter states that non-members of the United Nations shall act in
accordance with the principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Although the Charter is a
treaty instrument that holds a superior position among the treaties, it is
capable of binding non-parties at least so far as the rules of general
international law are concerned. For example, Switzerland has made it
known that it does not consider itself bound by decisions and resolutions
of the U.N., even though it has not in practice challenged U.N.
interpretations of its basic principles.70
Debate at the 1945 San Francisco Conference clearly indicated that
the delegates were unanimously committed to the creation of an
organization with the authority to uphold international peace, wherever it

67

See John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 255 (Oscar
Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (arguing many states, including the United
States, take the legal position that article 2(4) is a peremptory norm (jus cogens)).
68
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
69
U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
70
See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 223-224.
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is threatened. Such authority is not compatible with the full autonomy of
non-members.71
According to Brownlie, Article 2(4) constitutes an exception to the
rule that a treaty binds only the parties to it. The exception is based on the
specific character of the U.N. as an organization concerned primarily with
international peace and security. On the basis of that provision, certain
obligations on the part of non-members may arise under general
international law.72
It is quite clear from the Preamble of the Charter73 as well as from
the basic principles thereof that: (1) the included provisions are for the
general interest of the entire international community, (2) they constitute
the supreme rule that states are based on sovereign equality, and (3)
territorial integrity and political independence of the states are inviolable.
These concepts are to be protected in order to maintain international peace
and security at large. No state, regardless of its U.N. membership, can
thus violate such basic norms. To compromise with the non-members
with respect to those norms means to compromise with the maintenance of
international legal order designed for international peace and security.
States’

sovereign

rights

incur

responsibilities,

such

as

responsibilities not to resort to threat of force or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The state cannot
rule out such basic principles even if it is not a party to the treaty
embodying such principles. A treaty attempting to impose duties on third-

71

Richard A. Falk, The Authority of the United Nations Over Non-Members, in
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 220.
72
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 691 (1979).
73
“[T]o save succeeding generation from the scourge of war, . . . to practice tolerance
and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength
to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of
principles and the institutions of methods, that armed force shall not be used save in the,
common interest.” U.N. CHARTER preamble.
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party states is not void, as is a treaty in violation of a jus cogens norm.74
Therefore, the principle that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon nonparties becomes unavoidable. Article 2(6) is a mandatory provision and
has set a limit, determined by the general interest of the international
community, to the application of the main principles of the U.N. Charter.75
These basic normative principles of the Charter have been
accepted as universally obligatory; non-members have accepted them as
basic customary rules.76 The universality of these basic principles of the
Charter is supported by a number of important declarations of the General
Assembly, which speak for the obligations of all states not just of U.N.
members. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations was adopted unanimously by the General
Assembly in 1970.77 This declaration provided the interpretation of seven
basic principles of the Charter, speaks consistently of the obligations of
“every state,” and characterizes those principles as basic principles of
international law. As a result, these main principles gain the status of
peremptory norm in nature from which derogation is never permitted
unless another peremptory norm of similar standard is developed.
Conclusion
In general, International Law is criticized for the lack of
enforcement mechanisms. However, at least in cases within the realm of
international peace and security, the Security Council may take necessary
74

CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 80.
See OPPENHEIM & LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955); HANNIKAINEN, supra
note 11, at 222-223.
76
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 222-223.
77
GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970). See also GA
Res. 2734, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., at 22, U.N. Doc. A/ (1970); GA Res. 33/73, U.N.
GAOR, 33rd Sess., at 178, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/37 (1978); GA Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR,
20th Sess., at 11 (1965); GA Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/103 (1981); see HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 223 n.64.
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action in order to repeal any violation of international law that could
endanger international peace and security, so long as it falls within the
limits of Article 39.

Article 2(4) of the Charter, which is merely a

reaffirmation of the pre-existent norm in the Charter, is a peremptory norm
under international law and the fundamental provision of the Charter.
Yet there remained the question of who would determine the
violation of the norm reflected in Article 2(4) in the disorganized
international society. The Charter empowers the Security Council, a nonjudicial body, to make a formal determination concerning violations of
Article 2(4) as well as the violation of other principles of the Charter. For
example, the Security Council may identify certain situations as a “threat
to the peace” under Article 39 because of a violation of the principles laid
down in Article 2(4) of the Charter. The Council may then take further
actions for the enforcement of peace. A direct relationship is then found
between “threat or use of force” under Article 2(4) and a “threat to the
peace”, “breach of peace,” and “act of aggression” under Article 39, which
grants the Security Council jurisdiction under Chapter VII.
The power of the Security Council under Article 39 is, inter alia,
to investigate whether a breach of Article 2(4) is constituted, yet it is
apparent that the interpretation of Article 39 goes far beyond that. Article
2(4) did not only prohibit threat or use of force against territorial integrity
or political independence.

It also stated that threat or use of force is

prohibited if it is in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter.
This article allows the Security Council to find a broad meaning of “threat
to the peace.” According to Professor Hans Kelsen, it is completely
within the discretion of the Security Council to decide what constitutes a
threat to the peace.78 Indeed, the Security Council is not fettered in its
78
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powers of determination under Article 39, but the duty of customary law
and the general international law incorporated in the Charter limits such
discretion to be absolute. As a result, the peremptory norm, such as jus
cogens, now an established principle in international law and incorporated
in the Charter as a pre-existent norm, also limits absolute discretion of the
Security Council.
Technically, peace becomes threatened or breached when there is
violation of the Charter principles. As established earlier, the basis of the
Charter principles was deeply rooted in the supreme interest of the entire
international community of states and such principles gained the character
of jus cogens. Article 39 of the Charter, one may assume, confirms that a
violation of the norm of jus cogens exists, while a clear violation of article
2(4) and other principles of the Charter is found, which by nature is
constitutive of threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, or an act of
aggression.
Therefore, the role of the Security Council is also to safeguard the
hierarchical norms of international law.

Unless a violation of the

principles of the Charter has occurred, peace and security can hardly be
endangered. The Security Council is the body responsible for protecting
such laws, from which infringement may constitute a threat to the peace, a
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. In this sense, the Security
Council itself is also under an obligation to follow such legal principles.
For example, a limit of the Security Council under Article 39 is defined by
Article 2(4), specifically, “to go beyond that and, say, the determination
that a situation was a ‘threat to the peace’ when it was not a ‘threat of
force’ would be ultra virus.” 79

However, the changing structure of

international order shows that a violation of other Charter principles that
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are inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations could constitute
an infringement of the norm of jus cogens and thereby could be brought to
attention under Article 39 grounds (e.g., gross violation of human rights,
genocide, systematic rape, apartheid and so on).

79

N. D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 35 (1993).

